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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
1. **USSR-Berlin: Soviet treatment of Khrushchev's talk with Bonn ambassador seen as maneuver to emphasize "reasonableness"; basic USSR position remains unchanged.**
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
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USSR-Berlin: [As part of their effort to create an impression of reasonableness on Berlin, Soviet leaders since the party congress have used a wide variety of maneuvers calculated to achieve maximum publicity in the West in conveying alleged Soviet willingness to be flexible in any negotiations. The substance of the Soviet position, however, remains unchanged from the presentation made by Gromyko in his talks in the US. On 9 November, Khrushchev indicated to West German Ambassador Kroll that he could accept in "principle" the ambassador's suggestion for a combination of four-power and bilateral agreements to ensure Berlin's viability and free access. Soviet officials then passed to Western journalists in Moscow a four-point plan characterized as a "radical change" in Soviet policy on Berlin and a German treaty, which included some of Kroll's suggestion but was more in line with Gromyko's approach in the US.]


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Mali: Mali has requested the early departure of two USAF C-47 transports and their American crews based in Mali since July as part of a US military mission which has been training a company of parachutists for the Malian Army. Although this training program was recently completed, Malian Chief of Staff Soumaré wanted the US aircraft and crews to remain at least until next April. The subsequent overruling of Soumaré suggests that the influence of anti-Western extremist elements in Mali's one-party regime is increasing. Soviet military advisers in Mali, which has received supplies of bloc arms and equipment, may also have helped precipitate the decision. Secretary of State for Defense Diakite and Soumaré now are visiting Moscow, where their meetings with top-level military officials suggest they are negotiating further military aid agreements, probably including Soviet assistance in the field of military air transport.

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Philippines: President Garcia is reported to be "running scared" in the final days of campaigning for the Philippine presidential and congressional elections on 14 November. Reports in recent weeks have pointed to a close race, and the withdrawal on 4 November of independent presidential candidate De La Rosa has given a boost to the opposition Liberal candidate, Vice President Macapagal. Garcia's unexpected trip last week to the southern Philippines may have been a last-minute effort to make full use of his Nacionalista party's superior financial and organizational assets there, and has caused speculation that he may order a program to intimidate voters. [REDACTED] Page 8)

Turkey: The designation of 77-year-old Ismet Inonu as premier suggests that the military junta has decided the four parties which contested the 15 October elections will be unable to form a coalition in the normal manner, and that the junta will have to govern through Inonu and his Republican People's party (RPP) whether he can get a majority or not. The junta was expected to turn over power to an elected government on 29 October, but the other three parties, which together won 277 of 450 lower house seats by appealing to the supporters of executed premier Menderes, could not agree on a coalition. These three parties have deep antagonisms toward the RPP, but the junta may hope they will support Inonu in order to end the present stalemate and to avoid new elections, or even to forestall direct military rule. Any new elections would probably be held under circumstances more favorable to the RPP. The junta has just used martial law to close an influential newspaper of the pro-Menderes Justice party, which may indicate a tougher attitude. [REDACTED]

Ecuador: President Arosemena's first policy pronouncements have been relatively moderate but slanted to mollify his

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leftist-Communist supporters who were passed over in the selection of the cabinet. In speeches of 9 and 10 November, Arosemena declared that he was willing to establish relations with any country on the basis of "mutual desire," would trade with all nations, and would continue relations with the Castro regime. He added that party labels, including Communist, had no meaning for him, all citizens being "cherished Ecuadoreans." The president, however, is reported to have rejected Communist demands for the inclusion of extremists in his cabinet with the reply: "I am no Fidel Castro."

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According to Ambassador Berbaum, the new top military command is strongly anti-Communist and friendly toward the US, and two members of the new moderate-rightist cabinet have indicated to him their opposition to the Castro regime.

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Soviet Position on Berlin

Since the end of the party congress, the Soviet Union has accelerated the pace of its efforts to create a favorable climate for negotiations on Berlin and Germany. The Italian Foreign Ministry has confirmed that Khrushchev urged Italian member of parliament Codacci-Pisanelli on 3 November to inform the US, British, and French heads of government of his desire to negotiate. When Codacci observed that the term "negotiations" implies readiness to modify positions in order to reach agreement, Khrushchev replied that he understood this and said that Codacci should also pass this on.

At the 7 November Kremlin reception, Khrushchev made a point of talking with Western correspondents and emphasizing that the USSR would be patient and wait for the West to take the initiative for negotiations. In his talks with Western ambassadors at this reception, Gromyko also stressed Soviet readiness to begin negotiations on a four-power basis.

Khrushchev, who requested the 9 November meeting with Kroll, invited him to exchange opinions informally on Berlin. Kroll put forward a five-point plan: 1) a four-power agreement on a status for West Berlin and free access; 2) a Soviet - East German agreement in which the Ulbricht regime would undertake to respect the four-power accord; 3) agreement on "technical matters" by West Berlin and East Germany, as well as the Western powers; 4) a four-power agreement to establish committees on a German peace treaty and disarmament, with East - West German subcommittees to deal with nonpolitical matters; and 5) an agreement among interested powers to stop "provocative propaganda."

In response, Khrushchev indicated that he could accept this plan "in principle" and countered with three conditions: 1) abolition of the occupation status; 2) termination of any formal legal or political ties between Bonn and West Berlin; and 3) stationing of a "symbolic" Soviet troop contingent in West Berlin to carry out Soviet guarantees. On this last point Kroll gained the impression that Khrushchev was less than adamant.

Soviet sources promptly passed to Western journalists in Moscow a version of this conversation which included some of

Kroll's points, but in the guise of a new Soviet policy. The Soviet version included the four-power agreement on Berlin and the Soviet - East German agreement, but added the vague formula used by Gromyko in his talks in the US--that the Western powers would undertake "to respect East German sovereignty." The Soviet version dropped the details of Kroll's suggestion for four-power committees on a peace treaty and merely referred to the conclusion of a peace treaty as the final step. Soviet exploitation of Kroll's plan suggests that the Soviet leaders view it as an opportunity to stimulate debate in the West and increase public pressure for formal negotiations to determine the Soviet bargaining price for agreement.

Khrushchev's effort to convince Kroll that negotiations might yield dividends for the West was evident in the Soviet premier's statement concerning the wall in Berlin, which he claimed was erected on Soviet orders because Ulbricht was too weak to carry out such an important decision. Khrushchev said that the wall could be removed if there were satisfactory agreement on Berlin. He undercut this offer, however, by stating that as long as the "reasons" for the wall existed it would have to remain.

The only point on which Khrushchev became heated was in reference to the situation at the sector boundary in Berlin. He stated that moving tanks around in Berlin was a "childish" performance and stressed that the West would never induce the Soviets to become "traffic police." The contrast between Khrushchev's pose of flexibility on an over-all Berlin solution and his vehemence on the present situation in Berlin suggests that one purpose of the current campaign of conciliation is to divert attention from the continuing and uncompromising effort to reduce Western rights in Berlin to a minimum.

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Philippine Election Race

President Garcia's advantages in the election campaign are believed to have been reduced in recent weeks, partly because of factionalism among Garcia's Nacionalistas at the local level. The Liberals, with an intensive village-level campaign on the theme of government corruption and inefficiency, have probably also benefited from the steady rise in the prices of consumer goods over the past several months.

De La Rosa, now supporting Macapagal, is an independent Liberal from Macapagal's native area of Luzon. He had aroused unexpected enthusiasm, although he was not a serious contender and reportedly had entered the campaign at Garcia's behest to weaken the Liberals. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] De La Rosa's withdrawal was the result of a deal involving financial and political concessions in return for De La Rosa's endorsement. Nacionalista efforts to exploit reports that the Liberals used money from local tobacco interests to buy De La Rosa's withdrawal apparently come too late to affect the campaign. [REDACTED]

Although the Nacionalistas appear certain to retain control of Congress, uncertainty over the presidential and vice-presidential race raises the possibility of numerous election disorders. Registration of new voters in some areas of the southern islands has been reported disproportionately large in comparison with Luzon. There has been growing speculation that constabulary troops, normally assigned to police elections in areas of pre-election violence, may be used by Garcia to intimidate voters or to suspend voting for security reasons. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

Military Representative of the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Chairman, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

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The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

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